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ABSTRACT
Economic incentives behind retirement decisions come up in discussions around pension 
reforms. The 2005 pension reform in Finland was designed to also encourage longer working 
careers. While the relationship between pension accrual and employment decision is a complex 
issue, this study aims to take the first steps on the path towards considering this question in light 
of the register data on earnings-related pensions. We consider development in the employment 
of the elderly and explore the possibility of linking pension accrual and employment from an 
empirical point of view.
ABSTRAKTI
Eläkejärjestelmän ja sen luomien taloudellisten kannustimien välinen yhteys on olennaisessa 
roolissa eläkeuudistusten suunnittelussa ja seurannassa. Myös Suomen vuoden 2005 eläke-
uudistus pyrkii kannustamaan työssä jatkamista. Tässä tutkimuksessa pyritään lähestymään 
eläkkeen karttumisen ja työllisyyden välistä yhteyttä työeläkejärjestelmän rekisteritietojen 
suunnalta. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ikääntyneiden työllisyyskehitystä eläkeuudistuksen 
voimaan tulon aikaan. Lisäksi selvitellään mahdollisuutta tutkia työeläkkeen karttuman ja 
työllisyyden välistä yhteyttä empiirisestä näkökulmasta.
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1 Introduction
An aging population with shorter working careers and a longer retirement phase poses 
challenges to the sustainability of pension systems as well as to the whole economy. The aim 
of encouraging people to work longer prior to retirement has been one of the main objectives 
in many pension reforms. Pension systems have two main tools with which to steer old-age 
retirement decisions: economic incentives created by the pension accrual rules, and limits of 
the eligibility age. The first one is based on voluntary inducement to delay retirement, while 
the latter is a more stringent, legal restriction. 
Inducing people to work longer is not an unproblematic issue. People differ in their health, 
working abilities and their preference for work. Non-financial factors like the mental and 
physical burden of work, the general attitude to aging workers and support from the employer 
are also found to be critical factors when the retirement decision is made (Karisalmi, Tuominen 
& Kaliva 2008). It would be hard to gain political acceptance for the notion of forcing people 
to continue to work until a significantly older age than previously, for example by setting 
severe restrictions or benefit cuts. Employers might also be unhappy to be obliged to keep 
aging workers employed if the employees’ working motivation and abilities have decreased. 
Inducing longer working careers on a voluntary basis, for example with the help of economic 
incentives, is a more gentle way of pursuing the goal of later retirement.
A substantial pension reform took effect in Finland in 2005. The reform introduced e.g. 
a flexible retirement age instead of the earlier fixed eligibility age of 65. The basis for pension 
accrual was also widened to include the whole working career. To encourage longer working 
careers, accrual rates were changed so that the pension accrual rate increases with age. There 
are now three age-dependent accrual rates: 1.5, 1.9 and 4.5 percent. The highest accrual rate 
applies to people who postpone retirement until after age of 63, which is the lowest eligibility 
age for old-age pension.
The employment figures from this decade have shown a pattern of increase in employment 
rates for all age groups (figure 1). Especially in the age group between 60 and 64, the increase 
in the employment rate has been notable. Furthermore, it looks like the increasing trend in 
the growth of employment turns steeper at the time of pension reform for those between 60 to 
64 years old. 
There might be several explanations for increased employment among the elderly. 
For example, the general economic situation has positively affected the development of 
employment.1 Employers are more willing to also hire older workers in an economic boom. 
The improved health of younger generations may have been a background factor in making it 
possible to continue working. Part of the increase in the employment of the elderly might also 
be the result of incentive effects created by the pension system. Therefore, development of the 
1 In 2008 employment rates still continued to rise despite the first signs of an economic downturn. 
The recent economic situation with increasing number of layoffs is also very likely to reflect on 
employment figures among the elderly in the following years. 
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employment of elderly people is especially interesting in terms of evaluating the relationship 
between employment of the elderly and improved economic incentives for continuing at work 
that have been created by the pension system.
Figure 1. Employment rates.
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Source: Labour Force Survey, Statistics Finland.
While pension reform offers an opportunity to compare employment decisions before and 
after changes in the incentives and age limits, isolating the effect of reform remains in many 
ways challenging. The first challenge is the complexity of pension reforms with several mutual 
changes, not least the ones that are induced by external factors like the economic situation. 
The second concern deals with the creation and measurement of an indicator for economic 
incentives to retirement. The measure should be feasible not only in technical terms from the 
data, but also to employees making their retirement decision.
In this study we aim to dig deeper into the development of employment among the elderly in 
Finland. The first objective is to consider employment from the point of view of the registers on 
labour-income related pension insurance. This gives a complementary view to the development 
in employment compared to information provided by surveys. A large sample from the register 
also offers the possibility to consider employment figures in one-year age groups.
The relationship between employment and accrued pension wealth is an important factor in 
the discussion of economic incentives for continuing to work. Several measures can be used 
to consider economic incentives for working while in old age. In earlier research it has been 
pointed out that both the level of pension wealth and the increment from postponed retirement 
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have a relation to the probability of continued work.2 A second point of interest lies in the 
possibility to consider the relationship between employment and accrued pension with the help 
of data from the time of the pension reform. The complexity of the setup is brought up in the 
discussion of building an appropriate framework for analysing the question.
The study will proceed as follows. In the first part we concentrate on the employment figures. 
Chapter 2 introduces the register data forming the background of this study. In the register data, 
employment is measured differently than in the widely used Labour Force Survey provided 
by Statistics Finland. In Chapter 3 we compare the picture of employment development given 
by these two different data sources and consider employment rates in a one-year age group. 
In the next Chapter we consider employment with a different measure, the continuation rate, 
which describes the probability of continuing to work – or not retiring, in the case of the age 
group of our interest.
The second part of the study concerns the issue of pension wealth and employment. 
In Chapter 5 we briefly discuss some economic relations between the pension system and 
employment and the informational requirements of measuring pension wealth, a widely 
used concept to measure economic incentives concerning the choice between retirement and 
working. In Chapter 6 we briefly introduce some of the main features of the Finnish pension 
reform of 2005. The reform offers a unique situation, where the data of accrued pension rights 
to all Finns is available. We consider the possibility of deploying this information to study the 
economic incentives created by the pension system and its employment effects empirically. 
In the next Chapter, we explore the possibility of comparing if differing pension wealth is 
related to a different development in the employment of the elderly. Here we also discuss the 
difficulties in analysing a complex question like economic incentives not to retire. Finally, 
Chapter 8 concludes this paper.
2 A review on the earlier literature on issue can be found e.g. in Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) 
and Fenge and Pestieau (2005).
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PART I: DEVELOPMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AMONG 
THE ELDERLY – A PICTURE FORMED FROM 
PENSION REGISTERS
2 Building a dataset 
In Finland, all employment is covered by statutory pension insurance. Private sector employees 
are covered by the Employees Pension Act (TEL, after 2005 TyEL3). All persons between 18–68 
working under an employment contract and having earnings exceeding the minimum amount 
prescribed in the law are insured under TyEL.4 Farmers, self-employed entrepreneurs, public 
sector employees and some other small groups have their own pension acts, with very similar 
characteristics to TyEL.
The data used in this study is gathered from the registers of the statutory labour-income 
related pension insurance administered by the Finnish Centre for Pension. Our basic sample 
includes all persons born between 1936 and 1946, who have, at some point in life, been insured 
in the pension system based on their entrepreneurship or employment, either in the public or 
private sector.5 The dataset includes information on age, gender, employment and retirement 
for the years 2001–2006. Furthermore, due to the pension reform, everyone had their accrued 
pension rights calculated at the end of 2004. The information on labour income from private 
sector employees is included. The data on labour income is based on the information provided 
to insurance companies and tax authorities. 
In our analysis, we have left out those who are known to live abroad, who passed away 
in 2006 or earlier, or for whom we do not, for some reason, have observations for all of the 
years 2001–2006. Our main emphasis is on persons aged 60–65. A person is entered in our 
data at the earliest in 2001 or when he or she turns 60, and is followed at the latest until 2006 
or when he or she reaches the age of 66. For example, a person born in 1941 will be 60 years 
in 2001, so his or her information will be included in our data for the years 2001–2006, whereas 
3 TyEL replaced the Employees’ Pension Act (TEL), the Temporary Employees’ Pension Act (LEL) 
and the Pension Act for Performing Artists and Certain Groups of Employees (TaEL) in 2007. 
Until then the minimum requirement for pension accrual eligibility was a contract of at least one 
month (TEL) and a yearly income of a certain amount (LEL and TaEL). The minimum annual 
income required in LEL and TaEL was 769,19€ in 2006.
4 In 2009 the amount was 49.93 euros per month. The limit is revalued each year by the wage 
coefficient.
5 Our dataset also includes also who have had a previous working history in Finland, but who 
have later emigrated abroad. Information on the country of residence was available only for 
approximately half of the persons included in the data, so we were able to leave out only a number 
of those living abroad. Thus the dataset is actually larger than the total population. The difference 
in the datasets varies between 800 and 5000 persons per age cohort (as percentages, the difference 
varies between 1.5% and 6%).
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a person born in 1944 will be included in our age group and available to our data only where 
the years 2004–2006 are concerned. As cohorts are of different sizes, we have a different 
number of observations each year. In the end, we have a total of 638,582 persons in the data, 
with a little over 2 million observations. 
We define employment as being insured in the earnings-related pension system or having 
at least one employment contract during the year. When the information on whether one has 
had a pension insurance occurrence during the year is used as a measure of employment, 
very small amounts of work also become labelled as employment. As a result of aggregating 
employment to the annual level, retirement shows in the data on a one year lag: those who 
retire for example in April have worked three months and become labelled as employed for 
the year. However, we did not want to set limits to the length of the employment contract or 
amount of labour income, or exclude working while receiving a pension. Therefore, in our 
dataset a person becomes labelled employed even if he or she has worked only for a short time. 
In other words, the employment status refers to the situation at the beginning of the year. This 
has consequences to the interpretation of retirement: a person retired in the middle of the year 
becomes labelled as not employed only in the following year.
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3 Development in employment
Employment has risen in this decade in all age groups, but especially the elderly in the age group 
of 60–64-year-olds have faced a steep increase in the employment rate (figure 1). According 
to the Labour Force Survey provided by Statistics Finland, employment in that age group has 
risen from 27% in 2003 to 37% in 2006, and further to 41% in 2008. Our first step is to dig 
deeper into these figures. 
Comparison between two data sources
The definition of employment used in the register data differs from the one used in the Labour 
Force Survey. Employment in our study is based on the employment contracts that have been 
insured under mandatory pension insurance. In the Labour Force Survey, all work is registered: 
if a person is employed, if he or she has earnings from work during the survey week, salary 
or fringe benefits, or has been temporarily absent from work. 
Figure 2 considers the change in employment rates from 2003 to 2006. Register data is 
considered both with and without part-time pensioners. In most age groups, employment has 
increased somewhat less if part-time pensioners are excluded. This difference is, however, 
rather small. Although there are differences in some age groups, the pictures given by both 
sources are rather similar. The most notable exception is the age group of 61. In that age group 
employment has increased substantially faster according to register data than on the basis of 
the Labour Force Survey.6 
In addition to the change in employment rate, another point of interest lies in the annual 
employment rates in each age group. Comparison of these figures reveals that employment 
rates provided by the register data including all persons are systematically larger than ones 
provided by the Labour Force Survey (figure 3). Due to different definitions of employment it 
is natural that figures from the register data and the Labour Force Survey may differ. However, 
the development of employment given by both sources looks approximately the same. 
A one-year consideration reveals that the difference in development of employment among 
61-year-olds between register data and the Labour Force Survey results mainly from the 
years 2005 and 2006. In those years employment increases 2 percentage points faster in the 
register data than in the Labour Force Survey. The increase in the pension insured employment, 
excluding part-time pensioners, has also been rapid. For 2003–2004 the Labour Force Survey 
gives higher employment rates than the register data (again excluding part-time pensioners), 
by 2006 the order is reversed. 
6 One possible reason might be including LEL and TaEL into TyEL. Formerly TaEL and LEL had 
an annual minimum level of income that obliged to having pension insurance. After the reform 
the minimum amount depended on a monthly income that was notably lower. The way our data 
is constructed, even one month was enough to calculate these as employed. However, if this was 
the reason, one would have expected to see the same effect in other age groups too.
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Figure 2. Comparing increase in employment rates in 2004–2006 between two sources.
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Figure 3. Comparing yearly employment rates between two sources.
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In the age group of 62, employment rates show an increasing trend in all three measures. The 
increase is highest from 2004 to 2005. The biggest jump in the Labour Force Survey happens 
in that year, while register-based figures continue their strong increase from 2005 to 2006. 
The group of 63-year-olds follow the same increasing pattern in employment. Here the 
change in employment in register data is also highest from 2004 to 2005. There is a notable 
jump of 5 percentage points in the employment rates measured by the register data, while the 
Labour Force Survey shows more steady growth in employment in the years of our study.
In the two oldest age groups in our study, there is a notable difference between data sources. 
The Labour Force Study suggests a strong growth in employment rates during 2003–2006, while 
register data, both with and without part-time pensioners, indicate that following an increase 
in employment there is a drop in employment rates from 2005 to 2006. This is a surprising 
result, especially recalling that the pension reform took effect in 2005. These age groups 
were entitled to a higher incentive accrual after the reform, so a rise in the employment rate 
after the reform would have been a more expected result. The year 2006 is the first year when 
persons retired after the reform are no longer labelled employed, and 2005 figures reflect the 
number of retirement decisions before the reform took effect.7 Without a longer time period 
to examine, one cannot conclude whether there is a change in the employment development 
trend, or if 2005 is the exception. 
Gender differences
Our data also allows us also to check for gender differences (figure 4). Employment rates 
have developed rather similarly among both men and women. Women’s employment rates are 
somewhat below men’s employment rates, except for the age group of 60. Gender differences 
in employment rates increase with a person’s age; for 61-year-olds the difference varies 
between 0.5 and 2.2 percentage points, while for persons at the age of 65 the difference is 
between 5 and 6 percentage points. The difference is approximately the same when part-time 
pensioners are excluded.
The decrease from 2005 to 2006 in the employment rates of 64 and 65-year-olds appears 
both for men and women, although the decrease is larger for men. A sign of a similar trend 
can already be seen among 63-year-olds. The increase in employment rate in that age group 
seems to slow down, especially for women. 
7 Figures on 2005 might therefore include an anticipation effect. This seems, however, unlikely, 
as the protection rule ensured two pension calculations, one with the new rules and one with the 
old rules, and pension benefit according to rules whichever gave the higher benefit level.
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Figure 4. Employment rates by gender.
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4 Continuing to work
The move to retirement has been considered in earlier studies by concentrating on certain 
special paths to retirement. Rantala (2008) considers the figures from 1990 to 2002. He finds 
that the risk of retiring after the age of 60 has decreased after the recession in 1990s. His 
figures also show that there is a peak in the move to retirement between the ages of 60 and 63. 
Another path to retirement that has received a lot of attention is unemployment. Unemployment 
among the elderly and its relation to the pension system has been considered e.g. in Hakola 
and Uusitalo (2005), Hakola and Ilmakunnas (2006), and Kyyrä and Wilke (2007). 
An alternative aspect of the employment figures presented in the previous Chapter is given 
by the continuation rate. It tells how big a fraction of those who were working in the previous 
year continue to be employed also in the current year. The rest, who have not continued working, 
have in the age group of our interest most likely retired. There might also be persons who have 
become unemployed or have voluntarily withdrawn from the labour force. 
In order to consider movements out from employment, we construct the dataset differently. 
Each year we have picked those who are working and added information on their next years’ 
labour market position.8 The sample used in building this data is otherwise the same as in 
the earlier part, except for excluding those who seem to have “returned” to employment after 
retirement or another period outside employment. In our data, labour market status is given in 
the beginning of the year. We have repeated this for each year between 2002–2005, including 
information on employment in 2003–2006, and combined these annual samples into one 
dataset. The panel feature varies between types: there might be 1 to 4 years of information on 
each individual, depending on when person has moved out of employment (retired). In the 
end, we have a dataset with 579,074 observations on 252,854 persons.
Development of continuation rates
Continuation rates are typically higher than employment rates, because employment rates 
also take into account those who have already retired earlier, are unemployed or otherwise not 
working in that year. Furthermore, severe selectivity occurs. Those who continue working past 
60 constitute a selected group, for example in terms of their health and the early retirement 
paths their cohorts have been entitled to.
In our data, continuation rates for those between 60–63 vary between 80–92 per cent 
(table 1; figure 5). For those that are older, continuation rates are, rather naturally, lower. 
While continuation rates give comparable information on the probability of continuing to 
work between cohorts, it hides the number of actual persons behind the figures. The second 
row in each age group in table 1 shows the number of those who have continued to work. It 
has increased from 2003 to 2006 in all but the oldest age group.
8 It is also worth noting that a substantial part of the population, those who have retired before 
turning 59, are not included in the data.
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Table 1. Fractions and numbers of those who continued to work.
2003 2004 2005 2006
60 0.888 
27 885
0.909 
31 096
0.920 
40 850
0.922 
46 319
61 0.806 
17 612
0.819 
22 842
0.845 
26 576
0.865 
35 745
62 0.857 
20 987
0.878 
15 471
0.882 
20 362
0.888 
23 934
63 0.849 
12 152
0.867 
18 191
0.891 
13 980
0.884 
18 235
64 0.626 
8 379
0.745 
9 052
0.807 
14 939
0.673 
9 555
65 0.819 
6 337
0.823 
6 897
0.766 
7 101
0.604 
9 228
66 0.082 
495
0.105 
666
0.302 
2 151
0.407 
2 988
67 0.609 
290
0.655 
324
0.749 
534
0.721 
1 872
68 0.652 
202
0.745 
216
0.684 
242
0.596 
341
69 0.686 
155
0.728 
147
0.245 
59
0.179 
50
Total 0.814 
94 494
0.842 
104 902
0.861 
126 794
0.826 
148 267
Figure 5. Continuation rates 2003–2006.
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The first notable drop in the continuation rate happens at the age of 61. In other words, as 
people retire (or move out of employment) at the age of 60, the fraction of those continuing to 
work at the age of 61 drops (figure 5). A similar drop happens in the probability of continuing 
to the age of 64, and, most visibly, to the age of 66. These results coincide with the figures on 
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movements from work to retirement presented by Rantala (2008). He also finds peaks in the 
retirement probability at the ages of 60 and 63 (and 65, which is the old-age retirement age 
in the years he considers).
The 2005 pension reform changed eligibility ages as well as the rates at which pension 
accrued from additional work. The idea was to support employment of the elderly, especially 
after turning 63. Comparison of lines in figure 5 reveals some changes in the continuation 
rates from 2003 to 2006. 
The continuation rates of those between 60 and 63 follow a similar pattern in all the years 
of our study. At the age of 64, the probability of continuing to work varies between the years. 
In 2003 and 2006 continuation rates are low, while in 2004 and 2005 a larger fraction of 
those who worked in the previous year had continued working at the age of 64. Before the 
reform, the official retirement age was 65, which shows in the data as the most visible drop 
in continuation rate at the age of 66 in 2003–2004. There is still a drop in this age in the years 
following the reform, but the continuation rate has more than quadrupled from 2003 to 2006.
In the age groups of those older than 66 there are still quite high continuation rates, even 
though the number of observations decreases heavily (table 1). While in 2003, the fraction 
of those continuing to work was less than 10 per cent at the age of 66, the continuation rates 
for older age groups exceed the level of 60%. In the older age groups, 67 and 68 look rather 
similar in all years. In 2003 and 2004 the probability of continuing to work was rather high 
even at the age of 69, provided that a person had worked until then, but it decreased from the 
level of 70 per cent to around 20 per cent after the reform. 
Compared to the time before the reform, continuing to work became less frequent among 
65-year olds and those over 68, but more common among 66–67-year-old persons after the 
reform. The continuation rates of 63–64-year-olds increased from 2003 to 2005, and then 
dropped. In the age group of 65, the drop occurred already in 2005, and the continuation rate 
fell further in 2006. 
The drop in the continuation rate among 63–64-year-olds may partly have resulted from 
the changed rules of the retirement eligibility age. In the new pension system, this age group 
is eligible to start drawing old-age pension without reductions, while in the old system one 
could start drawing a pension before the age of 65, but with a permanent reduction to the 
pension benefit. Therefore, the fact that continuation rates start decreasing at this age in the 
years after the reform is not surprising. The same reason, the option to retire without a cut in 
the pension benefit, is likely to be behind the lower continuation rates at the age of 65 in the 
years after the reform.
The bottom row in table 1 shows the average continuation rate among 60–69-year-olds. It 
also increased from 2003 to 2005, and then dropped. Statistics9 on the number of new earnings-
related pensions show that there was an increase in the number of new pensions in 2005, right 
9 The increase in the absolute amount of new old-age pensions is partly due to bigger cohorts 
entering the eligibility age. The number of persons who retired directly on an old-age pension was 
in 2002–2004 around 20,000, while in 2005 it was 30,000 (Statistical Yearbook of Pensioners in 
Finland, 2008). 
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after the reform took effect. Especially the number of new old-age pensions increased notably. 
The reason that the drop comes only a year later in our analysis results from the fact that we 
have aggregated employment for the whole year. Those who, in 2005, retired later than in 
January are in our data labelled as employed in 2005 and retired or non-employed only in 2006. 
Gender differences
In our dataset there are almost equal numbers of men and women (50.35% are men). 
Continuation rates look very similar between genders. In general, men have slightly higher 
continuation rates almost in all age groups (table 2).
The development of continuation rates from 2003 to 2006 shows a similar pattern for both 
genders. Continuation rates have increased among those aged 60 to 62 and 66-year-old persons. 
In the age group of 63–64 and 67 there is increase until 2005, but then the continuation rates 
drop in 2006. For those aged 65 and 68 to 69 the drop occurs already in 2005.
There are some, rather small differences between genders. Women’s continuation rate 
has increased from 2003 to 2006 especially at the age of 64, where in 2003 women had a 
16 percentage point lower probability of continuing to work, but in 2006 their continuation 
rate was as high as that of the men. Another age group in which women’s continuation rate 
has increased faster than that of men is 66. Women’s probability of continuing to work has 
increased from 7% in 2003 to 41% in 2006.
Table 2. Fractions of those who continued working, by gender.
2003 2004 2005 2006
60 men 
women
0.895 
0.882
0.913 
0.904
0.922 
0.917
0.923 
0.921
61 men 
women
0.827 
0.785
0.846 
0.794
0.868 
0.824
0.880 
0.851
62 men 
women
0.862 
0.851
0.885 
0.872
0.890 
0.874
0.897 
0.879
63 men 
women
0.857 
0.841
0.881 
0.852
0.903 
0.879
0.899 
0.867
64 men 
women
0.706 
0.544
0.774 
0.715
0.833 
0.778
0.669 
0.677
65 men 
women
0.825 
0.811
0.836 
0.806
0.826 
0.699
0.634 
0.569
66 men 
women
0.089 
0.072
0.116 
0.091
0.292 
0.316
0.404 
0.412
67 men 
women
0.607 
0.613
0.693 
0.591
0.745 
0.755
0.739 
0.698
68 men 
women
0.644 
0.667
0.742 
0.750
0.711 
0.631
0.597 
0.595
69 men 
women
0.699 
0.663
0.746 
0.691
0.245 
0.244
0.206 
0.122
Total men 
women
0.821 
0.807
0.846 
0.838
0.866 
0.857
0.830 
0.822
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PART II: EMPLOYMENT AND PENSION WEALTH 
– AN EXPLORATION INTO THE ECONOMIC 
INCENTIVES OF NOT RETIRING
5 The relationship between pension wealth  
 and employment
The pension system and employment are in relation through two basic mechanisms from the 
economic point of view. First is the effect of pension wealth on lifetime utility maximisation 
with decisions concerning savings and retirement. Second is the effect of marginal pension 
wealth, i.e. change in pension wealth from an additional period of working. Accrual rules and 
actuarial features of the pension system determine marginal changes in the pension right and 
thereafter the economic incentives to continue working.
The traditional life cycle hypothesis suggests that accrued pension wealth and the timing 
of retirement are actually a result of the same optimization problem: a person maximises 
lifetime utility restricted by the budget constraint. A person retires when the utility of working 
one more period and continuing to save up for retirement is lower than the utility of retiring 
and starting to spend savings. If the pension system is voluntary and the amount of savings, 
investment decisions, and the repayment schedule of savings can be planned by each individual 
without restrictions, pension contributions are similar to private savings and do not distort 
labour supply decisions.
This optimization process might end up not being optimal after all, when uncertainties, 
imperfect insurance markets and possible deviations from standard rational decision-making are 
taken into account. For example, the lack of annuity type insurances complicates consumption 
smoothing due to uncertainty regarding the length of a lifetime. In behavioural economics, 
several deviations from traditionally assumed well-behaving preferences and rational decision-
making are brought up. People might, for example, underestimate their future needs and 
preferences, or suffer from a lack of self-control in their savings decisions.10
These imperfections or deviations from rational behaviour have led to pension systems 
being mandatory and regulated in most countries. Individuals have only limited opportunities 
to influence the contribution rates, investment portfolios and repayment schedule of savings, 
i.e. the pension benefit, its indexation and time profile. In these cases, pension systems start to 
have some similarities to taxation, creating distortions to the incentives of working.11 Therefore, 
incentive effects are an important part of designing a pension system. 
10 For a recent survey on findings in behavioural economics, see DellaVigna (2009).
11 Barr and Diamond (2008) present a comprehensive analysis on the relationship between labour 
market incentives and the design of pension system. 
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In the earlier research, economic incentives are found to have a crucial effect on retirement 
decisions.12 Both the level of pension wealth and the increment to pension wealth from 
continuing to work are shown to affect the decision to retire.13 A three-phased international 
research project on the issue is reported in Gruber and Wise (1999; 2004; 2007). They found that 
the economic incentives of pension programmes have effects on the labour force participation. 
Furthermore, the effects are found to be rather similar in different countries. 
Measuring pension wealth
One approach to economic incentives of retiring is the effect of pension wealth. The most 
comprehensive definition of pension wealth includes the total amount of pension benefits 
a person will receive during the rest of his or her lifetime, discounted to the present value. 
However, as the length of lifetime is uncertain, pension wealth cannot be accurately calculated at 
the individual level. A further difficulty takes place if the person is not yet retired at the moment 
of calculating pension wealth, but still continues working and earning more pension. In such 
a case, approximating the total lifetime pension wealth of an individual requires assumptions 
of the development of both career and earnings.14
Besides the stock of pension wealth, the change in pension wealth is an important part of 
the economic incentives created by the pension system. Annual pension accrual rates can be 
used as determinants for the payoff from working one more year. In addition to the marginal 
increase in pension wealth resulting from additional pension accrual, there is also a drop in 
pension wealth as the present value of the total amount of expected pension benefits decreases, 
since the person in question will be receiving benefits for one less year. In actuarially neutral 
systems this is taken into account and pension benefit increases from the additional working 
year, both by the amount of additional accrual earned that year and actuarial adjustment.
Measures based on the discounted value of future pension rights include complicated 
features that might be hard to capture. Individuals’ responses to reforms depend on their own 
understanding and beliefs in the changes in variables defining the incentives. The extent of 
people’s knowledge of incentives in pension systems and their expectations regarding future 
changes are shown to have a crucial role in economic behaviour.15 Chan and Stevens (2008) 
consider the puzzling empirical finding that while most people have poor knowledge of their 
12 See e.g. Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) and Fenge and Pestieau (2005). 
13 Samwick (1998) finds that the increment in pension wealth is a crucial factor determining the 
retirement decision, while e.g. Coile and Gruber (2000b), Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2002) and 
Chan and Stevens (2004) provide evidence that also the level of pension wealth affects retirement 
expectations and decisions.  
14 Commonly used measures like peak value (Coile and Gruber 2000a & 2000b) and option value 
(Stock and Wise 1990a & 1990b) take into account more than just the effect of one additional 
year of working. Both of these require estimating labour income in the future. Option value, in 
addition to that, requires assumptions of utility, which is not measurable in general.
15 The extent of knowledge and its effect on individual behaviour is considered in Bottazzi, Jappelli 
and Padula (2006). Expectation of changes in the pension system has been discussed e.g. in 
Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) and more recently in Attanasio and Wakefield (2008).
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own pension plans, retirement behaviour seems to be responsive to changes in the economic 
incentives for retiring. They found that well-informed individuals change their behaviour more 
due to changes in incentives, while those with less information also change their behaviour, 
but to a lesser extent, and they base their decisions on their own understanding and beliefs 
regarding the incentives created by the pension system. 
As a result of data limitations to estimating pension wealth and informational reservations 
to using a complex concept as a determinant for pension wealth for the whole lifetime, one can 
concentrate on a slightly  narrower definition for pension wealth. Instead of estimating total 
wealth accrued from the pension right, which would require assumptions on the remaining 
lifetime, rates of interest and discounting, one option is to concentrate on the pension right per 
month. Remaining lifetime and future interest rates are not observable to individuals either, 
so it is plausible that they may base their decision-making and consideration of economic 
incentives on a concept that is more easily comprehensible, like the monthly pension right. This 
is especially plausible in a defined benefit system, where benefits do not depend (or depend 
only partly) on the rate of return of pension funds. 
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6 Finnish pension reform in 2005  
 and changed economic incentives
The pension system in Finland went through a notable reform in 2005. There were several 
changes that affect labour market incentives.16 One of the most notable changes was flexibility 
in the old-age pension age. Instead of the earlier 65-year eligibility age, individuals can now 
choose their retirement age between 63 and 68. Another important change concerned pension 
accrual rates. Instead of the earlier two pension accrual rates (1.5% for working between 23–59 
and 2.5% for working between 60–65) there are now three age-dependent pension accrual 
brackets. The accrual rates are 1.5% for those aged 18–52, 1.9 % for those aged 53–62, and 
an incentive accrual rate of 4.5% for those aged 63–68. Contrary to earlier rules, additional 
pension now accrues from work until the age of 68 even if a person already receives pension, 
although in that case the accrual rate is 1.5%.
There is also the possibility of taking retirement early or postponing retirement outside the 
flexible retirement age. Retirement can be taken early at most by one year or postponed after 68 
for as long as the individual wishes. Pension benefit is adjusted downwards by 0.6 percentage 
points for each month that retirement is taken early before turning 63. In postponement, the 
pension benefit is increased by 0.4 percentage points per month after the age of 68. There is 
no adjustment to the pension benefit in the 63–68 age bracket. 
Pension reforms usually offer great opportunities for considering changes in people’s 
behaviour.17 A possibility to empirically consider the relationship between the pension system 
and the retirement decision requires an unpredicted change in incentives. The Finnish pension 
reform in 2005 may work as such an unpredicted change in accrual rates: after the reform, 
pension accrual was calculated in a different way, which may have resulted in a change in the 
retirement age that is optimal from the point of view of the lifecycle model. 
Ideally, the empirical setting includes observations both on persons affected by the reform 
and persons who are outside the new rules, to identify the effect of the reform. The protection 
rule included in the Finnish pension reform ensured that all persons whose working contract 
have started at the latest in 2004, and who retire before 2011, get two pension calculations: 
one according to new pension accrual rules and one according to the old rules.18 The retiree’s 
pension benefit will be determined by whichever rules give a higher benefit. Even if this 
protection rule is not distributed arbitrarily, it is something that is determined by the past 
16 The features of the reform most related to labour market incentives are listed more accurately in 
Appendix A. More details on these as well as other features of the Finnish pension system after 
the 2005 reform can be found e.g. in Hietaniemi and Ritola (2007).
17 There are some other examples of earlier literature employing the opportunity offered by pension 
reforms. Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) use earlier Finnish reforms to consider changes in early 
retirement schemes from the point of view of labour demand. Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2006) 
employ the changes induced by Italian pension reforms to consider households’ expectations of 
future pensions and private savings.
18 This holds true for all pension types, but our main interest here is in movement to old-age pension.
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working career, and thus exogenous to the employee. It therefore creates a situation close to a 
quasi-natural experiment, where a section of the population is effectively outside the reform.
However, the number of protected, i.e. those whose pension benefit will be determined by 
the old rules, is very low, only around 0.1 % of new retirees in 2005 and 2006. The fraction is 
slowly increasing, but the level of those who are effectively outside the reform remains low.19 
Therefore the protection rule does not offer a genuine option to build treatment and control 
groups to identify the effects of the pension reform on employment. 
Earlier literature on the employment effects  
of the Finnish pension reform in 2005
The Finnish pension reform of 2005 introduced several features that were designed to encourage 
labour supply. However, evaluating the effects of the reform on employment is challenging 
because there are many other things in addition to the change in incentive accrual rates that 
has changed at the same time. The employment effects of this particular reform have been 
evaluated earlier by Lassila and Valkonen (2005) and Hakola and Määttänen (2007). Because 
no data on the actual behaviour after the 2005 pension reform have been available earlier, both 
of these studies base their evaluation on theoretical models and simulations. 
Lassila and Valkonen (2005) use the Finnish Overlapping-Generations Simulation Model 
to evaluate the effect of the reform on employment. They estimate that the reform results in 
postponement of retirement by 1.5 to 2 years. The effect on employment might, however, 
remain moderate. The reason is that people might want to lighten their working career at earlier 
points in time e.g. through part-time pensions, sabbatical leaves or reduced working hours.
Hakola and Määttänen (2007) consider the employment effects of the pension reform with 
the help of a stochastic dynamic programming model. Their model suggests that the reform will 
result in an increase of 0.8 years in the retirement age and a 1% increase in the employment 
rate. They also conclude that most of the effect of prolonging working careers results from the 
change in pension rules rather than incentive effects. The fact that, alongside the new incentive 
accrual rates, also the eligibility ages for unemployment pension and starting old-age pension 
earlier were increased are found to be the biggest reasons for postponing retirement. 
Both studies suggest that the reform boosts employment. While isolating the effect of the 
reform from other things with the help of empirical tools is demanding, we next aim to take 
some first steps to consider the development of employment of the elderly in the light of 
pension insurance registers. 
19 The fraction of new retirees affected by the protection rule was almost 1% in the first part of 2009. 
Protection is more common among those with a high pension, compared to those with low accrued 
earnings-related pensions. As more data on later years becomes available, the role of protection 
rules will be an interesting question for future research.
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Building a dataset
We start from the data used in the previous part that includes employees in each year and 
information on their labour market status for the following year (for the years 2003–2006). 
For the purposes of considering the relationship between pension wealth and employment we 
have to limit our data further.
In order to have a point to consider the economic incentives behind a retirement decision, 
one should carefully consider who has an option to choose between continuing work and 
retirement. An obvious limitation to the retirement choice is created by the eligibility age 
for old-age pension. Before the 2005 reform, the general old-age pension age was 65, but 
retirement could be taken early during the ages of 60–64 with a cost of a permanent reduction 
to the pension benefit, or postponed with an increase to the pension benefit. Following the 2005 
reform there is a flexible retirement age of 63–68, with a possibility to retire early – at the 
earliest when a person turns 62, or postpone it after 68. As a result, we have concentrated on 
persons aged 62–65, who had the option to choose old-age pension both before and after the 
reform. The employment rates for those 66 or older are low, so they are also excluded from 
this analysis. As there will later be more data on the employment of those between 65 and 68, 
they are also an interesting group to consider in the future.
One not-so-voluntary path to earlier retirement is disability pension, which requires a 
medical verification of decreased ability to work. This group also includes individual early 
retirement pension, for which the role of medical factors is lower than in other disability 
pensions. It is plausible to think that those who are granted disability pension are not actually 
making a genuine choice between working and retiring, as disability pension is only granted 
based on medical criteria.20 Furthermore, as we do not have variables on individuals’ health, 
disability pension could also be interpreted as a proxy for a person’s health. Therefore we 
have excluded persons who are on full or partial disability pension at any time between 2001 
and 2006.21
Part-time pensioners are a group that stands out from the others. They are both pensioners 
and workers, usually with a low pension and low labour income. Their incentives to continue in 
the labour market differ from those choosing between full-time work and full-time retirement. 
Therefore we have left part-time pensioners out from our analysis at this point. 
In our data we have information on the pension accrual for all observations at the end of 
the year 2004, when the pension accrual was calculated for everybody due to a reform of the 
accrual rules of the pension system. In addition to this, we have information on the labour 
income of a section of the population for the years 2001–2006. With the help of accruals 
in 2004 and the data on labour income, we have estimated pension accrual for each year of the 
20 In practice, especially partial disability pensioners do have an option to continue working. Their 
incentives are, however, likely to differ from those who are in better health and therefore deserve 
a separate analysis concentrating on this group’s special features.
21 This creates a bias to the group that is left. Those who have become disabled before the end of 
2006 are excluded from the data also for earlier years. This does not happen to younger generations 
who enter the data, but might become disabled for example in 2007. 
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period 2002–2006.22  Note that for the years before the reform, i.e. 2002–2003, pension did not 
accrue directly based on labour income. Therefore we have approximated pension accruals for 
each year. The same also holds true for the years following the reform: there is a protection 
rule valid until 2011, ensuring that if the old system would result in a greater pension than the 
one granted by the new rules, the retiree gets the pension according to the old rules. Therefore, 
the pension right has been estimated by both old and new rules for years 2005–2006 for all 
persons in the data.
As a measure of pension wealth, we estimate the amount of accrued pension right at the 
end of the previous year. In other words, the amount of earnings-related pension that a person 
would have received had he or she retired in the beginning of that year.23 While informational 
limitations discussed earlier are important, in this study we assume that individuals fully 
perceive the effect of working on their monthly pension right.
At this point the limitations of available information begin to restrict our data. Our sample 
includes evaluated pension accruals for all types that were insured in the private sector, and only 
to some extent those employed in the public sector. In order to have comparable observations 
on all persons, we limit our calculations only to those who were employed in the private sector 
at the end of 2004. Even in this limited subsample, complete information is not available so 
we have excluded some groups with clearly implausible pension accrual estimates. As our 
subsample includes only those who are working, zero pension accrual is very likely to be a 
special case we have not been able to take into account in our evaluation.24 Furthermore, the 
cohorts born 1938–1939 (those that are 64 in 2003 and 64–65 in 2004) have questionably low 
median estimated pension accruals (table 3), suggesting that there might be some systematic 
imperfections in out data.
Table 3. Median labour-income related pension accruals*, euros per month (number of ob-
servations).
2003 2004 2005 2006
62 683 
(8 359)
759 
(6 328)
849 
(8 405)
1 080 
(10 435)
63 714 
(4 799)
805 
(7 478)
894 
(5 684)
1 042 
(8 009)
64 348 
(4 375)
836 
(4 271)
964 
(6 644)
1 272 
(5 579)
65 297 
(3 489)
330 
(3 611)
997 
(3 590)
1 273 
(6 420)
* The figures consider only labour-income related pension accrual. The national pension system, that is income-
tested for other pension income, substantially equalizes the distribution of pension accrual by increasing the lowest 
pensions.
22 The details of estimating pension accruals are presented in Appendix B. 
23 In addition to earnings-related pension, Finns also receive national pension if the earnings-related 
pension is low. National pension is phased out as earnings-related pension increases so that if 
earnings-related pension exceeds a yearly defined limit, no national pension is granted. In 2009 
the upper limit for earnings-related pension which no longer entitles to national pension was 
1207.38€/month for single pensioners and 1075.30€/month for couples. See Hietaniemi and Ritola 
(2007) for details.
24 This group includes 2300 observations, which are mainly from the years 2002–2003. 
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The medians of estimated labour-income related pension accruals fall behind the statistics 
of new old-age pensions started in the private sector in each year.25 One explanation for this 
difference is that in our data, nobody has retired yet, but estimated figures describe what these 
persons would have received had they retired. Another reason is the exclusion of disability 
pensioners. The difference is somewhat bigger in the years 2003–2004, suggesting that our 
limited data results in estimates that are downwards biased. Especially for those that were 64 
in 2003 and 65 in 2003–2004, the estimates are too low to be considered reliable. However, the 
bias of this underestimation is similar to all observations. So we find it useful to carry on the 
analysis to the question of a relationship between pension wealth and employment, as long as 
we keep in mind the qualification that in the oldest age groups pension wealth is underestimated.
In the end, the data we are considering has 97,476 observations including information on 
48,179 persons or 86,001 observations on 40,157 persons, if the cohorts born in 1938–39 with 
problems in pension accrual estimates are excluded.
25 The annual statistics used in comparisons can be found in the annual yearbooks of Pensioners 
and insured in Finland.
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7 Different pension wealth  
 – different development in employment?
The Finnish 2005 labour-income related pension system is supposed to encourage people to 
work longer by creating economic incentives not to retire at the earliest possible retirement 
age, 63. The incentive accrual rate was also seen as a good opportunity especially for those 
with a low pension accrual to increase their future pension. Thus it is interesting to compare 
the increase in the employment of persons with different pension accrual. It seems plausible to 
assume that although the changes in the incentive accrual rate were the same for all, in relative 
terms persons with higher accrual may benefit differently from the pension reform compared 
to those with a low pension accrual from their earlier working career.
Conditional continuation rates
One rough estimate to consider if there is a relationship between different pension wealth and 
employment is given by conditional continuation rates. For this purpose we divide each age 
group into those with low, high and intermediate accrual. As a limit we use the median pension 
accrual in that year among the same one-year age group, plus and minus 5%. In other words, 
those with pension accrual of less than 95% of the median are labelled as low pension accrual 
and those with pension rights higher than 105% of the median are labelled as high pension 
accrual. By excluding the narrow intermediate group (that amounts to 5.4% of observations), 
we try to avoid the problem of setting a fixed, more or less arbitrary, limit between low and 
high pension accrual.
Pension accrual seems to have some relation to continuing in employment among the 
group our data concerns (Figure 6).26 The differences between genders in the development of 
continuation rates in the high and low pension accrual groups look very similar for men and 
women. Continuation rates of those with low pension accrual exceed high pension accrual 
types’ figures in most age groups. 
There is one notable difference in the continuation rates between the genders; namely, 2006 
figures in the age group of 64. While men’s figure showed that the continuation rate had fallen 
deeper in the high pension accrual group, for women the case is the opposite. In this group 
the continuation rate of high pension accrual women remains higher than in the low pension 
accrual group. The continuation rate among 64–65 year-old women falls more from 2005 
to 2006 among those with a low pension accrual. 
26  From this figure we have excluded the cohorts born 1938–39 due to our suspicion of the reliability 
of the estimates on their pension accrual.
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Figure 6. Fraction of men (upper figure) / women (lower figure) who continue working, by 
groups with lower and higher pension accruals, 2003–2006.
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If the pension reform created different economic incentives for high and low pension accrual 
types, we would have expected to observe differences in the development of continuation 
rates among pension accrual groups following the reform. In our data, as employment status 
refers to the beginning of the year, 2006 figures present retirement decisions after the reform. 
The development in the probability of continuing to work looks rather similar for high and 
low pension accrual types. Therefore our tentative results do not give support for this view. 
However, one should keep in mind that if estimates for pension accrual are not accurate, this 
result may change. Furthermore, we have figures from only one year after the reform, but the 
effects may become more visible in the longer run.
One promising path to expanding this analysis would be to divide persons into two groups 
by their relative payoff from continuing to work, i.e. instead of using just pension accrual, the 
dividing factor could be for example wage/pension accrual. From the point of view of economic 
theory it is intuitively plausible that it is the relative payoff of continuing to work that affects 
decision-making. However, this demands a lot more accuracy from the estimates of pension 
accrual and comprehensiveness of wage information than our data allows.27
Linear regression
As a next step, in order to consider the relationship between pension accrual and employment 
decision we use a simple linear regression model where pension accrual is used as a control 
variable in continuous form. In addition to the pension wealth level, the alternative source of 
income, wage, is also considered. 
We estimate a linear probability regression model for the following cases:
εθγδβα  genderpensionageyearEmployed    (1a)
εθψγδβα  genderwagepensionageyearEmployed   (1b)
On the left hand side we have employment as a dependent variable. It receives value 1 if the 
person continues working and 0 otherwise. The average of this variable can be interpreted as 
a continuation rate, meaning the percentage of persons who were working in the previous year 
and continue working also in the given year. 
In both models we have year and age as control variables, to capture possible trends and 
age-specific changes in the employment rate. Gender is also controlled for: there are likely 
to be differences between men and women in the probability of continuing to work. Here, 
monthly pension is used as an explanatory variable for employment. In model (1a) we have 
pension wealth as an explanatory variable. In the second modification (1b), labour income 
is added to the previous model.28 Wage is likely to capture a lot of variation that is due to 
27 As labour income information is used to estimating pension accrual, possible biases and missing 
information cumulates to both factors of relative payoff.
28 An alternative way to include the wage rate to regression would be to consider wage in relative 
terms, for example as a ratio between pension and wage income.
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differences in personal characteristics, like education and occupation, but also to some degree 
characteristics like a preference for leisure and health. Furthermore, as additional labour-income 
related pension accrues linearly from income, this variable can also be interpreted to capture 
the effect of marginal pension accrual, while previously accrued monthly pension controls for 
the level of pension wealth. 
In table 4 we present the results of the estimation of equations (1a) and (1b). Pension and 
income are used in logarithmic terms. This enables us to consider relative changes instead of 
absolute changes that are tied to a certain point in the pension or wage distribution. Linear 
probability models are estimated by OLS.29 As a result of the panel characteristic of our data, 
we use clustered standard errors. Year 2003 and age 62 are used as basic values. The number 
of observations is lower in the model where wage is used as an explanatory variable. This is 
because our data does not include wage information for all persons, even if the information 
on their labour status is available. 
The first two columns present the case where the oldest cohorts born in 1938–39 are 
excluded, while columns (3) and (4) include also those two cohorts with suspiciously low 
estimates for pension wealth. In all cases, pension wealth has a negative coefficient. This 
implies that the lower the pension accrual, the more likely a person is to continue working. 
Being female decreases the probability of being employed, as does aging, too. The decrease in 
the employment rate in 2006 reflects on the results as well, the coefficient for 2006 is negative, 
while it is positive for earlier years. 
The estimate for the effect of pension wealth on the probability of continuing to work is 
rather small. When wage is not included in the regression, the estimate is 1% in the data without 
cohorts born 1938–39 (column 1). Introducing wage income into the model (column 2) turns 
the effect of pension wealth to insignificant, while wage, rather surprisingly, has a negative 
coefficient. Usually higher wage induces higher employment. A possible explanation is that 
wage absorbs the effect of important variables our data has not allowed to control for, such as 
health, education, occupation etc.
A similar regression with the whole sample produces somewhat different result. When only 
pension is considered, its effect on the continuation probability is at the level of 3%. Introducing 
wage into the model does not change the estimate for the effect of pension accrual at all, but 
now the coefficient for wage income does not differ statistically significantly from zero. The 
coefficients for age, year and gender dummies have expected signs, following previous cases.
Our interpretation of these results is that while higher pension accrual is likely to have 
a negative effect on the probability of continuing to work, the magnitude seems to remain 
rather low. Furthermore, the estimates for pension wealth and labour income are sensitive to 
the age groups included in the analysis and to the inclusion of wage income as an explanatory 
variable. Especially this analysis suffers from lack of further control variables not available 
in the register data. At least health, education and occupation are factors that are very likely 
to be important determinants behind the probability of continuing to work in old age.
29 The results of the marginal effects of the used variables on the probabitility of being employed 
remain qualitatively the same if the models were estimated with probit instead of linear regression.
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Table 4. Estimation results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(pension) -0.011 -0.004 -0.031 -0.031
(0.001)** (0.002) (0.001)** (0.001)**
log(wage) -0.014 -0.002
(0.003)** (0.002)
year 2004 0.048 0.052 0.043 0.049
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.003)** (0.004)**
year 2005 0.077 0.082 0.067 0.073
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.003)** (0.004)**
year 2006 -0.015 -0.005 -0.024 -0.012
(0.004)** (0.005) (0.003)** (0.005)*
age 63 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
age 64 -0.099 -0.108 -0.095 -0.102
(0.004)** (0.005)** (0.003)** (0.004)**
age 65 -0.136 -0.143 -0.102 -0.101
(0.005)** (0.006)** (0.003)** (0.005)**
women -0.022 -0.024 -0.033 -0.035
(0.002)** (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.003)**
Observations 86 001 52 461 97 476 58 476
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Year 2003 and age 62 are used as basic values. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
Caveats in the analysis
Building an empirical setting to consider the effect of changed economic incentives on the 
employment is demanding. First question relates to measuring incentives: the variable used 
should be available from the data, but also to those making employment decisions. The 
second challenge is building a model. Retirement decisions are not made only on the grounds 
of economic profitability, but also several other issues that are usually hard to measure, such 
as, for example, physical and mental requirements of the current job, the spouse’s retirement 
plans or a person’s own perception of their health and work ability. 
As a measure of pension wealth we have used an estimate of monthly pension a person 
would receive if he or she retired. The advance of this measure compared to widely used, 
more complete instruments of pension wealth is that it is comprehensible to decision-makers. 
It can also be calculated from the register data with the help of pension accrual information. 
However, as the exact amount of pension accrual results from a long working history with 
several pension rules and details applied to each individual, estimating monthly pension accrual 
accurately turned out to be demanding. Our estimates, especially for the early years of the 
analysis, are likely to be biased downwards. 
Another important thing to note in our analysis is that pension accrual estimates are available 
only from one sector, although it is the largest. Therefore the results concern only private sector 
employment. In Finland, the public sector is an important employer and many employees have 
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a working history and pension accruals from both sectors. For the completeness of analysis 
it would be important to have both public and private sector information on pension accruals 
available in the future studies.
Register data includes only register-based information on the length of the working 
career, accrued pension and income. What it does not have is background variables. The only 
background information we have been able to control for are age and gender. Our analysis lacks 
a lot of important factors behind employment decisions, such as health, education, occupation 
and information on the household, especially on spouses. Persons that have continued working 
until past 60 years of age are in some sense already a selected group. For example, they are 
likely to have better health than their age group on average, as those who have become disabled 
have already moved to disability pension or otherwise left the labour force. Also, unemployment 
in this age group is worth mentioning. A part of the cohort has been unemployed and entitled 
to unemployment pension. Not being able to control for these important factors is likely to 
create an omitted variable bias to our results.
Identifying the effect of changed economic incentives is challenging also from the technical 
point of view. In the case of many reforms, a difference-in-difference framework is widely 
used. In the optimal case it is based on the possibility of comparing two otherwise similar 
groups, one of which is affected by the reform, and the other which is not. In social sciences 
there is seldom such a possibility to exclude a part. The protection rule in the 2005 pension 
reform in Finland offers a possibility to consider a control group. However, the number of 
protected right after the reform took effect was too low to build a control group. Even if, in 
the future, the number of protected would enable using them as a control group, problems still 
remain. A control group should be otherwise similar to the treatment group, so that the only 
difference is the reform. But in the case of pension reform, the group that benefits from the old 
system is very likely to be selected. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the protection rule and 
who benefits from it would be an interesting question to consider in the future. However, using 
the protection rule to build a control group for econometric comparison requires a detailed 
analysis on the special features of this group. 
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8 Conclusions
The relationship between the pension system and employment is a crucial factor in the 
discussion of a pension system’s sustainability. Economic incentives created by the pension 
accrual rules are brought up alongside discussions of pension reforms. The 2005 pension 
reform in Finland changed accrual rules and eligibility ages with an aim to encourage longer 
working careers. 
In principle, a pension reform offers an opportunity to try to evaluate the incentive effects 
of the pension system on the development of employment. Identifying the pure effect of a 
pension reform is, however, difficult. We have approached this question by considering the 
development in employment of elderly at the time of reform. We have also explored the 
possibility to evaluate the relationship between employment and economic incentives not to 
retire created by the pension system.  We build our analysis on a sample from pension registers 
administered by the Finnish Centre for Pensions. 
Employment rates follow mostly the same pattern as figures given by the Labour Force 
Survey provided by Statistics Finland. The most notable difference was that in the register 
data there is a drop in employment of the older age groups in 2006, whereas according to the 
Labour Force Survey, the employment rate keeps on rising. A possible explanation behind 
this is a different definition of the employment and an anticipation effect of the 2005 pension 
reform. To see whether the drop in the employment rate implied by the register is a change in 
the trend or if 2005 is an exceptional year we would need data on later years. 
Continuation rates give an alternative way of looking at employment among elderly. By 
continuation rate we mean the probability that a person who worked in given year continues 
to be employed also in the following year. Continuation rates are typically high, suggesting 
that being employed one year is quite a good approximation for the employment status for 
the next year. There are drops in continuation rates suggesting that ages of 60, 63 and 65 are 
common retirement ages. While the pension reform in 2005 changed the eligibility age for old-
age retirement, 63 and 65 still stand out as widely used retirement ages. However, continuation 
rates show that the probability of continuing to work from 65 to 66 has increased more than 
four times from 2003 to 2006. 
In the second part we explored the possibility to employ accrued pension rights as 
determinants of economic incentives to retire. Monthly pension accrual is a good instrument for 
pension wealth in terms of measuring economic incentives, as it is comprehensible to workers 
making retirement decisions. However, economic incentives are only one factor behind the 
retirement decision. Therefore building an appropriate econometric framework to consider 
this complex question is challenging. 
We have discussed the challenge of measuring pension wealth, as well as employing the 
change in the economic incentives to postpone retirement offered by a pension reform. Building 
a setup to compare behaviour in different groups, where a part is left outside the effects of the 
reform, would be an optimal starting point to identify the influence of economic incentives. Such 
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a quasi-natural experiment, where a randomly picked part of the population is excluded from 
the reform, seldom occurs in social sciences. The protection rule in the Finnish 2005 pension 
reform might offer such an opportunity in the future, as the number of protected increases.
We have presented some figures on the relationship between employment and accrued 
pension. Due to the technical shortcomings of our data, these figures should be interpreted 
more as an example of how the relationship might look like in a selected group. We considered 
conditional continuation rates for both genders and separately for those with high and low 
pension accrual. There are some differences in the development of employment between the 
groups. Continuation rates are somewhat higher among those with a low pension accrual. What 
we would have expected was a different development in continuation rates between high and 
low pension accrual groups at the time of reform. However, development in the probability of 
continuing to work looks in most cases similar for both pension accrual groups. 
We have also considered a simple regression model where pension wealth is used in 
explaining the probability of continuing to work. While higher pension accrual is likely to 
have a negative effect on the probability of continuing to work, the magnitude according to 
our estimates seems to remain rather low. These results seem to be rather sensitive to chosen 
variables and age groups.
In this study we have tried to take the first steps towards considering the relationship between 
economic incentives and retirement. We are aware of many caveats in the analysis, so the results 
should be interpreted more as an exploration into the world of economic incentives behind 
the decision between retiring and continuing working. However, we find that our preliminary 
work gives some foundational building blocks in developing the analysis further in the future, 
as more comprehensive register data, a wider set of background variables and information on 
additional years become available.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Finnish Pension reform 2005
The pension system in Finland went through a notable reform in 2005. The features of the 
reform most related to labour market incentives are listed below.
Pension right accrual and benefit determination 
In the design of the pension reform, special attention was paid to incentives to continue 
working. Actuarial fairness was improved by extending the time span from which pension 
right accrues: instead of the earlier 23-year age limit, pension now accrues from all work done 
between the ages of 18–68. 
Before the reform there were two accrual rates: 1.5 percentage points a year for the age 
group 23–59, and 2.5 percentage points a year between the ages of 60–65. In retirement the 
accrued percentage points were added up to give the total accrual percentage. Before the reform, 
the income on which the pension benefit was based, pensionable wage, was counted separately 
for each work contract and took into account at most the last 10 years of each working contract. 
The pension benefit was determined by the accrued percentage times the pensionable wage.
In the reform the pension accrual was changed to have a strict relation to the each year’s 
labour income. Now the labour income, according to which pension benefit is determined, 
is based on the wage and salaries from the whole working career at age 18–68. The pension 
accrual is calculated as a percentage of the annual income. The accrual rates are 1.5% for 
the 18–52 age group, 1.9% for the 53–62 age group, and an incentive accrual rate of 4.5% for 
employees aged 63–68. 
No upper limit for pensions 
The earlier rule of pension integration was abolished in the reform. Even though there was no 
upper limit for pension benefit in Euros, pension integration created an upper boundary for 
the pension benefit at the level of 60% of the highest salary in the working career. Abolishing 
this rule supports the incentives for working created by the incentive accrual rate. 
Retirement age 
Before the reform, the retirement age for the old-age pension was 65, which could be taken 
early through an early retirement scheme between the ages of 60 and 64 by reducing the benefit 
permanently by 0.4 percentage points for each month that the retirement is taken early prior 
to the age of 65. Old-age pension could also be deferred, with a 0.6 percent increase for each 
month that the start is postponed.
After the reform, the old-age pension eligibility age is flexible: it can be chosen between 63 
and 68 without any reductions in the pension benefit. Early retirement is available from 2005 
on only for the age of 62, with a reduction in pension benefit of 0.6 percentage points per 
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each month before turning 63. Retirement can also be deferred after 68, which increases the 
pension benefit by 0.4 percentage points per month. Between 63 and 68 there is no actuarial 
adjustment in the pension benefit.
Working and retirement 
Before the reform, work did not accrued further pension rights if a person was already receiving 
full-time pension. After the reform, working alongside receiving pension is supported by further 
pension accrual. If a person is both working and receiving pension benefit, additional pension 
accrues at the rate of 1.5% regardless of a person’s age. 
Life expectancy coefficient
The amount of the pension benefit is adjusted to the changes in life expectancy. The accrued 
pension is multiplied by the life expectancy coefficient when the old-age pension starts being 
paid. It reduces the monthly payable pension when the life expectancy increases. It will be 
applied for the first time to the old-age pensions starting in 2010.
Protection rules  
As is usually the case, also this reform included protection rules to ensure at least some time 
to anticipate the situation at retirement. To make the move to the new rules a smooth one, the 
pension benefit is, under some conditions, calculated according to both old and new rules, 
and the higher pension benefit is admitted. These conditions require that a person is retiring 
before 2012, and that his or her current employment contract has started at the latest in 2005. 
Various gradual changes have been done to pension rules in the 1990s and in the beginning 
of the 2000s. For example, the eligibility age for the unemployment path, i.e. the possibility to 
continue unemployment with full unemployment benefits until one reaches retirement age, has 
been raised several times, from 53 to 57. There are protection rules, so that persons born 1943 
or later are still entitled to unemployment pension at younger age. The eligibility age for 
individual early retirement pension was raised from 55 to 60 before it was totally abolished in 
the 2005 reform. The protection rule, however, ensures that those born in 1944 or earlier are 
still entitled to early retirement pension. In our analysis, all but one age group are under this 
protection rule. Only those, who are 62 in year 2006 (i.e. born in 1944) have higher eligibility 
age for continued unemployment. In the 2005 reform, unemployment pension was abolished 
for those born 1949 or later. As our main focus is on persons aged 62–65 (and 60–65 in the 
employment rate figures), a change in the eligibility age does not harm our analysis too much.
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Appendix B: Approximating pension wealth
The Finnish pension reform of 2005 changed the rules by which pension rights are calculated: 
instead of earlier working contract-based accrual, the pension is from 2005 onwards 
calculated from the annual labour income. As a result of this change, pension wealth accrued 
by 31 December 2004 from the currently valid employment contract was calculated for all 
persons that have pension right in Finland. We employ this information in our estimations of 
pension wealth.
Our data includes information on the accrued pension from earlier employment contracts 
and the accrual of the employment contract that was in effect at the end of 2004. In addition 
to this, we have information on labour income for the years 2001–2006 for a section of the 
population. Information on income is most complete for those working in the private sector. 
To have comparable estimates on pension wealth we have concentrated on a subgroup of the 
data; those working in the private sector. 
Pension accrual prior to 2005 pension reform
For the years 2001–2003 we have to estimate pension accrual backwards. For this we need 
information on the months of the whole working career and the pensionable wage.30 Months 
for the working career are available in our data. Pensionable wage, instead, has to be estimated. 
Pensionable wage is the average maximum wage of the last ten years of the employment 
contract in question. For that we have used information on the pensionable wage calculated 
at the end of 2004. As we have income information only from 2001 onwards, we have made 
an assumption, that
   
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2004
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wageepensionabl  (B1)
where pensionable wage2004 is available in the data, epc is the employee’s pension contribution 
deduction (4.3% for persons under 53 years old and 5.4% for persons 53 years or older), and 
years = max (10, the length of the current employment contract). From this equation we can 
solve for pwage, the average pensionable wage for those years that are used in calculating 
pensionable wage for year 2004, but for which our data does not have information on the labour 
income. After that we estimate pensionable wage for earlier years (j=2001–2003)
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30 For the details of the Finnish pension system prior to 2005 reform, see Hietaniemi and 
Vidlund (2003).
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where   yearstartingjj −−− ,1)2001(10minα  is the number of years of the length 
of the working career that we do not have income information on but need to calculate the 
pensionable wage, and  1,10min − yearstartingjβ  is the number of years that are 
considered in pensionable wage. 
For those for whom we do not have the starting year of the employment contract, we use 
only income information from 2001 to 2004. And for those for whom we don’t have income 
information, we assume that their income has been constant over the years: pensionable wage 
from 2004 divided by β. 
After having pensionable wage for the years 2001 to 2003, we can turn to estimate pension 
accrual. It is given by





  ≥
12
*025.0
12
*015.0* 6060
monthsmonths
wageepensionablaccrualpension jj  (B3)
where 60months  is the number of months a person has worked between ages 23 to 59, and 
60≥months  is the number of months a person has worked after reaching the age of 60. In the 
pension system prior to the reform, pension right was accrued at 1.5% a year for working 
between the ages 23–59, and by 2.5% a year for working after reaching 60. For persons who 
already receive pension, no new pension is accrued regardless of whether they work or not. 
Thus, for retired persons we use pension accrual from the previous year.
Pension accruals after 2005 pension reform
As a result of the protection rule we have to estimate pension accrual also after 2004 according 
to both old and new rules. The annual increment in pension accrual comes directly with the 
help of income:
incomeepcaccaccrualpensionaccrualpension jj *)1(*%1 − −  (B4)
where acc% is the accumulation percentage: 1.9% for persons 53 to 62, 4.5% for persons 
63 to 68, and 1.5% for retirees. Previous years’ pension accrual is naturally indexed to the 
value of the year in question by the wage index.  
The protection rule ensures that those who retire at the latest at the end of 2011, and retire 
from an employment contract (in the private sector) that have started at the latest at the end 
of 2004, get two pension calculations; one according to the old rules and one according to the 
new rules. Under the protection rule, a retired person gets whichever pension is higher. Thus 
we need to calculate pension accruals for years 2005–2006 also according to old and new 
rules. Pension accrual according to the old rules follows eq. B1–B3 exactly the same way as 
presented above.
The question of who is protected and who is not is more complex. Unfortunately, in our 
data we do not have information if the working contract has ended in 2005. We have assumed 
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that all persons who do not retire continue in their old jobs. As we have restricted our data to 
include only private sector employees, in our data all working persons become protected. This 
is a restrictive assumption that may cause some bias to our results. However, it is likely that 
elderly workers (62–65) who are working seldom change their jobs. The good side of this is 
that we can look at the differences between the pension systems, had all persons been protected.
Matching estimates to register information on pension accrual in 2004
Finally, after having estimated pension accruals for all the years 2001–2006, we compare our 
calculated results to those given in the data for the year 2004. There were some differences, 
but in most cases, these differences were small. To better match our calculations to the data, 
we calculate the difference between our estimation and the pension accrual given in the data 
for 2004. We believe that this difference is due to some features of the pension system that 
we have not taken into account in our estimations. Such things can be protection rules from 
earlier pension reforms, pension accruals from unpaid periods or other special cases. If this 
is so, the difference is systematic in the years of our interest. Therefore, we have estimated 
relative bias in our own calculations for year 2004, and added the same difference to all our 
estimations of pension accruals.
Previous working contracts and timing of retirement
What is done so far considers only the last employment contract. As the pension system prior to 
the 2005 reform was based on calculating accrued pension rights from each contract separately, 
we have information on the earlier accruals in our data. In addition to this earlier accrual, there 
is also a multiplier that is defined separately for all persons to correct the pension accrual for 
unpaid periods (this is given in the data). 
One more important feature we need to take into account is deferral adjustment, i.e. the 
effect of delaying retirement or starting it earlier. In the old system, the official retirement age 
in the private sector was 65 years. The pension is permanently cut by 0.4% for each month of 
retirement that occurs before the age of 65. There is also a benefit from deferring retirement: in 
the old system, pension is increased by 0.6% for each month that a person continues working 
after turning 65. In the new system, a person can retire at the age of 63 without having his or 
her pension cut. Retirement can be taken early at the age of 62, when the pension is cut by 
0.6% for each month, or the gain from postponing retirement until after the age of 68 gives a 
0.4% increase to the pension.
The figure of our interest is the amount of pension per month a person would receive had 
he retired in year j. Although pensions are, naturally, in practice calculated very accurately, 
most of our data is at the annual level. Therefore we use the pension accrual in the end of the 
previous year as a measure of the monthly pension. It is given by
    1** − jj adjustmentdeferralmultiplieraccrualpensionaccrualearlierpension  (B5)
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In the old system there is relative cap for pension benefit, called pension integration. Pension can 
not exceed 60% of the highest income of one’s career. Unfortunately, we do not have income 
information on the entire career, but only for a section of the population for the years 2001–2006. 
As the income path tends to decrease at the end of the career and our data considers elderly 
workers and pensioners, it is likely that the top income year has been sometime earlier. Thus 
we believe it would do more harm if we used our income information to form the pension 
roof to our estimations of pension accrual. We just note that our estimates for pension accrual 
according to the old rules are biased upwards.
Exact calculations of each person’s pension accrual would have required information on 
their total working career. Taking into account all earlier reforms and changes to pension rules, 
as well as person-specific special cases would have been an unrealistic option for the purposes 
of this study. Our approximations are on average very close to real pension accruals, but it 
is important to keep in mind that pension accruals calculated here are only estimates of the 
accrual that a person would have had if she or he had retired. 
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